| چکیده انگلیسی مقاله |
Introduction: With the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey has significantly distanced itself from the Kemalist tradition and has attempted to become a major player in the Middle East. This unprecedented level of involvement and presence in the Middle East, coupled with Turkey’s shift away from its Western orientation in the 2010s, draws attention to factors related to the AKP’s Islamic identity. Part of this identity stems from the party’s association with the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Turkey has long been a venue for international Muslim Brotherhood meetings, and there are also examples of ideological kinship between the AKP and the Muslim Brotherhood in terms of agency. Since Erdogan came to power, the AKP has shown a willingness to form coalitions with secular and liberal elites in Turkey. The party also, in its early years, constantly assured foreign observers of its commitment to secularism and good relations with Israel. This attitude was obviously at odds with the ideology of the founder and subsequent leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood. This coincided with the Arab Spring and the peak of the dominance of Ahmet Davutoglu's ideas in Turkey's foreign policy system. During this period, Turkey viewed the Brotherhood as a trump card in its diplomatic mix. Erdogan viewed cooperation with the Brotherhood and efforts to expand Turkey's communication network by relying on Islamic organizations led by the Brotherhood as a way of reclaiming Turkey's true self. Even after the suppression of the Brotherhood following the coup in Egypt in 2013, reorganization and logistical efforts to strengthen the international community of the Muslim Brotherhood were hosted in Istanbul, and members of the Turkish Justice and Development Party continued to support the Muslim Brotherhood. The developments in the Arab world since 2010 have created a great opportunity for Turkey to reconsider its role in the Middle East and to gain a special position to develop its political model. This culminated with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia. But the Arab Spring marked a new phase in bilateral relations. The Muslim Brotherhood, at least strategically, used the popular discourse of the “Turkey model” to gain political legitimacy against widespread accusations of terrorism, and by viewing the Justice and Development Party as a successful fusion of Islam and democracy, it was able to present itself as a legitimate actor pursuing a similar, viable, pro-Western project in Egypt. In this regard, Turkey has also placed support for the new interpretation of the views of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in the Middle East on its agenda in its foreign policy in the region in order to achieve maximum benefits. The developments in the Arab world in 2010, which led to the emergence of movements inclined towards the Muslim Brotherhood in power in Egypt and Tunisia, were seen by the Justice and Development Party as a sign of its civilizational and cultural expansion, and the party saw this as an opportunity to strategize its relations with the new governments of these countries. But later, with the fall of these movements from the power pyramid in Egypt and Tunisia, Turkey's regional strategy was disrupted and changed direction from the principle of "reducing problems with neighbors to zero" to neo-Ottomanism and direct and indirect political-security interference in the Arab countries of the Middle East. Tensions in relations with Egypt and at one point with Saudi Arabia, military intervention in Syria and northern Iraq, and disagreements with Iran regarding some regional issues such as Syria were among the consequences of this policy. Research Question: The main question of this article is: What are the defining characteristics of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in guiding the foreign policy of the Turkish government in the Middle East? According to the research hypothesis, not only does the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on the nations of the region imply the strengthening of neo-Ottomanism, but the Muslim Brotherhood has also adapted its policies to the views of Turkish foreign policy by making changes. Theoretical framework of the research: In this article, one of the best models for analyzing the determining characteristics of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in guiding the foreign policy of the Turkish government is the structuralist approach, which looks at the relationship between identity and foreign policy. Accordingly, identities determine the foreign policy interests of states and interests are the guiding light of countries' foreign policies. Therefore, it is necessary to emphasize structuralism for two reasons. The first reason is related to the identity paradigm of the Muslim Brotherhood and the role of ideology (beliefs, ideas, norms, and values) in both the old and new generations of this movement. The second reason is related to the intellectual and cultural characteristics of the Turkish government, which are especially present in this country's foreign policy towards the Middle East region. Research Method: The research method in this article is descriptive-analytical and the data were collected through documentary and library methods. Research Results: After the Justice and Development Party took control of Turkey with the election of Erdogan as Prime Minister in 2003, it adopted completely different positions from the Muslim Brotherhood and showed a desire to form an alliance with secular and liberal elites in Turkey; in foreign policy, it aligned with the policies of the United States and tried to join the European :union:. The AKP also, in its early years, promoted a commitment to secularism and improved relations with Israel, which conflicted with the views of the Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, before the 2011 revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood saw the AKP model as a threat to itself and feared that the movement’s younger members would adopt similar ideas. But this situation changed rapidly in the following years, especially with the Arab Spring and the peak of the dominance of Ahmet Davutoglu's ideas in Turkey's foreign policy system. The electoral successes of the Muslim Brotherhood and later its victory in the presidency strengthened relations between Turkey and Egypt. The movement consistently highlighted political and ideological similarities with Erdogan. Morsi assured Egypt's international partners that its relations with Israel would not change. The partnership between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Justice and Development Party also offered significant economic opportunities for both political entities. The support of the Erdogan government and its supporters within the Justice and Development Party (AKP) for the Muslim Brotherhood can be categorized within the framework of several theoretical perspectives: 1.Political Islam: Erdogan and the AKP have historically shared ideological commonalities with the Muslim Brotherhood, both of which are rooted in political Islam. Turkey has positioned itself as a champion of the Islamic world and a counterweight to the influence of traditional regional powers and the West, and has supported the Muslim Brotherhood as a means to challenge the established order in the Middle East and demonstrate Turkish influence in the region. 2.Neo-Ottomanism: Support for Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood can be seen as part of Erdogan’s efforts to exert influence and leadership in the region, reflecting Turkey’s Ottoman past as a protector of Muslims. Erdogan’s foreign policy through the lens of neo-Ottomanism signifies a radical change in Turkey’s domestic political system and foreign policy priorities. 3.Regional Power Projection: By aligning with Islamist movements, Turkey can expand its sphere of influence, form alliances with like-minded actors, and balance the influence of rival regional powers. 4.Populism: By supporting Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Erdogan can appeal to his conservative and religious base at home while simultaneously strengthening his image as a leader on the global stage. According to the findings of this study, some of the most important characteristics of the Muslim Brotherhood for Turkey’s Middle East foreign policy are as follows: 1.Historical support: The Erdogan government explicitly supported the Muslim Brotherhood and its emergence in countries such as Egypt after the Arab Spring. The Justice and Development Party shares ideological affinities with the Muslim Brotherhood in some areas, particularly in their approach to blending Islam with democratic governance. However, tensions arose between Erdogan's government and the military-backed interim government in Egypt, which ultimately ousted President Mohamed Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, from power in 2013. 2.Regional dynamics: Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood has led to tensions with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, as these countries consider the Brotherhood a destabilizing and destructive force. This is despite the fact that, from the perspective of the effects of the Muslim Brotherhood discourse on Turkey’s Middle East policy, its positions on Syria and its comparison with other countries appear contradictory; Because Turkey has supported popular protests in Syria (like Tunisia and Egypt), but has supported the status quo and established political regimes in Libya, Bahrain, and Yemen. 3.Domestic Politics: While the Justice and Development Party supports the Muslim Brotherhood due to its Islamic ideology, other political factions, including secularists and the military establishment, consider the Muslim Brotherhood a threat to Turkey's secular principles. 4.Security concerns: Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood has raised security concerns, particularly over allegations of supporting militant groups affiliated with the Brotherhood’s ideology. These allegations have fueled tensions with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Turkey's stance on the Muslim Brotherhood is just one aspect of its foreign policy that intersects with complex regional dynamics, including issues such as the Syrian conflict (one point of contention with Iran as a regional power), the role of political Islam, and the competition for leadership in the Muslim world. 5.International Status: Turkey's alignment with the Muslim Brotherhood has also affected its international status. This has led to tensions with Western countries, especially the United States and members of the European :union:, which do not have a positive view of the Muslim Brotherhood and criticize Turkey's support for the organization. 6.Shifts in Strategy: In recent years, Turkey has moderated its approach to the Muslim Brotherhood, reducing its public support while maintaining a level of ideological affiliation. This shift reflects Turkey’s need to balance its regional ambitions with changing geopolitical realities. In recent years, Turkey has changed its approach towards the Muslim Brotherhood and adopted a more nuanced stance. While maintaining ideological affiliation, Turkey has reduced its overt public support for the organization. This change can be attributed to a variety of factors, including domestic and international considerations. Conclusion: The relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Justice and Development Party has affected Turkey's Middle Eastern foreign policy in two ways. First, the historical influence of the Muslim Brotherhood among the nations of the region and contemporary movements seeking to revive political Islam has made this movement, which is considered a prominent and comprehensive model of moderate and active Islam for the politicians and elites of the Justice and Development Party, effective in advancing the policy of neo-Ottomanism. Second, the close and multilateral relations between the Muslim Brotherhood movement and the Turkish Justice and Development Party government, due to the identity discourse and intellectual, ideological, and normative character, are reflected in Turkey's foreign policy doctrine, and especially in this country's Middle East policy, which is complex, multifaceted, and even faces contradictions and challenges. |