| چکیده انگلیسی مقاله |
Abstract Medical fertility treatments have recently gained widespread acceptance among couples worldwide and are considered among the most innovative and popular reproductive technologies. Despite their growing popularity, these treatments encompass complex social, cultural, and legal-judicial dimensions. In particular, the mere use of infertility treatment methods often raises numerous legal ambiguities, primarily because Iranian law does not comprehensively address contractual aspects of infertility treatments, leaving involved parties facing significant legal uncertainties. One critical issue pertains to errors that may occur during various stages such as embryo preservation, freezing, thawing, or implantation in uterus. In cases of effective errors, the financial consequences for medical fertility procedures become significant, including considerations related to alimony and damages. Among these, inheritance rights stand out as a particularly sensitive and complex issue. While other financial effects—such as child alimony and compensation—are also noteworthy, this discussion will focus exclusively on the inheritance rights of children born through medical fertility techniques. The question of whether inheritance constitutes a legal right or a legal rule, as well as the exclusivity of its causes and obstacles, has led to divergent opinions in the field of child inheritance. This is especially pertinent in cases of heterologous fertilization, where a third-party donor intervenes outside the couple. An essential question arises: does a child born from a donation possess inheritance rights in the event of effective mistake, and if so, who does he inherit from? Specifically, in the absence of explicit regulations in "Embryo Donation Method to Infertile Couples" law of Iran, there remains considerable ambiguity. This ambiguity is compounded by the lack of clear legislative guidance, prompting reliance on reliable jurisprudential sources and fatwas. It is noteworthy that jurists and religious scholars often differ on issues related to the inheritance rights of children born from embryo, fetus, or surrogate pregnancies. Consequently, no consensus exists on the matter. This study, employing both library research and online data, adopts a descriptive-analytical approach to explore the hypothesis that Article 864 of the Iranian Civil Code, which emphasizes the principle of causal heirs, provides the most appropriate and legally consistent framework for inheriting children born from donor techniques, particularly in the context of heterologous fertilization. This approach appears to face the fewest jurisprudential and legal challenges, given that neither Islamic law nor national legislation officially recognizes depriving a child of inheritance due to a procedural or medical error. In essence, inheritance fundamentally depends on lineage and causality. Obstacles to inheritance, such as swearing, blasphemy, murder, or being born of adultery, are well-codified under Articles 880 onward of the Civil Code, leaving little room for expansion. Conversely, reasons for inheritance—such as Jarira's guarantee, allegiance of emancipation, and allegiance of leadership—have historically been adaptable and evolve in accordance with societal needs. Accordingly, the possibility of modifying, removing, or replacing existing cause including donor gametes and embryo appears legally and religiously permissible since such innovations reflect child's best interests and benefits. In English and French law, the reasons for inheritance include lineage and cause, but adoption is also a cause of inheritance in French law. Therefore, from the perspective of the reasons for inheritance, they have similarities with Iranian law. However, in these two legal systems, by using the theory of judicial parentage and recognizing the child resulting from the donation as a natural and legal child, they have temporarily prevented further challenges, while denying the biological and natural identity of the child—an approach that raises long-term concerns about the child's interests because child's biological identity is not a matter removed or changed by parties agreement. This issue has not been considered in systems such as England and France, or at least it has been shown to be very unimportant, and the primary and main priority is the child's belonging to the recipient family. This neglect of the truth and biological identity of the child will certainly present serious problems to the social order and system. Thus, in case of effective mistakes, the only desirable protection that can be seen in other legal systems, including England and France, is the provision of numerous protective institutions that will protect the child from possible physical and mental dangers, and undoubtedly, the capacity of an efficient and advanced compensation system can provide desirable protection to the victim of an effective mistake. Certainly, from this perspective, the English and French legal systems can be a model to some extent and provide effective protection for the rights of the child resulting from donation by localizing the protective systems. |